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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
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Michael Wray
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the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall
(a) administer t h e rotation and scheduling of
panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for t h e Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals h a s jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders
and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, overt
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting froim
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencie"
or appeals from the district court review of info
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, eft
cept t h e Public Service Commission, State Tal
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil.
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
w
(b) appeals from t h e district court review « |
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies?!
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
m
(d) appeals from t h e circuit courts e x c e ^ j
C1
those from the small claims department of a H
cuit court,
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court
record m criminal cases, except those involve*
charge of a first degree or capital felony,
,
(f) appeals from district court in crifliup
cases, except those involving a conviction
first degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from orders on petitions *° r J |
traordmary writs involving a criminal c0 3
tion, except those involving a first degree or
tal felony,
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(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited
to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(j) cases transferred to t h e Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, m its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings
1988
78-2a-4. Review of actions b y Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
1986
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals h a s its principal location in
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within t h e state

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
["Section
B78-3-1 to 78-3-2 Repealed
^78-3-3
Term of judges — Vacancy
J78-3-4
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals
78-3-5
Repealed
8-3-6
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly
£-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed
[8-3-11 5 State District Court Administrative System — Primary and secondary county
locations
Repealed
Costs of system
Repealed
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries
13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed
»-14 5 Allocation of district court fees and
fines

15, 78-3-16 Repealed
16 5 Fees for filing and other services or actions
Repealed
Application of savings accruing to counties
Judicial Administration Act — Short title
Purpose of act
Definitions
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary
Court administrator — Powers, duties,
and responsibilities
Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives

Section
78-3-26
78-3-27
78-3-28
78-3-29
78-3-30

Courts t<
tistical
courts
Annual j
Repealed
Presiding
Compe
Duties of

78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Rej
78-3-3. Term of juc
Judges of the distnc
tially until the first g
three years after the
ment Thereafter, the
district courts is six
first Monday in Janu<
election A judge whos
request of the Judicia
appointed and qualifie
78-3-4. Jurisdiction
cuit court
(1) The district cour
matters civil and c n m
Constitution and not
(2) The district cour
dmary writs and othei
effect their orders, ju<
(3) Under the gener
officer of the Judicial
established by the J u d
district court, which a
jurisdiction of the circL
the circuit court by the
court in multiple judge
judge in single judge c
cases may be made up
upon the motion of e
When an order is made
shall transmit the plea
court to which the ca
court has the same j u n
originally commenced
appeals from final judg
Appeals
(4) Appeals from the
decrees of the district c
and 78-2a-3
(5) The district cou
agency adjudicative pre
ter 46b, Title 63, and s
ments of that chapter,
cative proceedings
78-3-5.

Repealed.

78-3-6. Terms — Mil
Each district court s
seat of each county witr
each quarter of the year
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Rep
78-3-11.5. State Dist
System — I
cations.
(1) There is establish
mmistrative System T
minister the operation
(2) In this chapter, "c
District Court Adminis

FRAUD
Failure to comply with rules and requirements.
on must leave a posted hunting unit immedi>on request of a landowner or posted hunting
ait, if that person:
) does not have in his possession a posted
ting unit permit;
) endangers or has endangered h u m a n
ty;
i) damages or has damaged private property
lin a posted hunting unit; or
f) fails or has failed to comply with reasoni rules of a landowner association.
1988
I. D a m a g e or destruction of property.
son on the land of another person may not
nally damage, disarrange, or destroy t h a t
property.
1988
J.

Violation of chapter — Class B misdemeanor.
>erson who violates any provision of this chaplilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless another
is provided elsewhere in the laws of this
1988
4.

L a n d o w n e r protection u n d e r Lando w n e r Liability Act.
owners who participate in posted hunting
hall have the full protection afforded under
r 14, Title 57, the Limitation of Landowner
;y Act.
1988

Section
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

794

795
with deposit acco
(ii) "Creditor" n
tution which extei
financial accomm(
agreement with a
(iii) "Debtor" n
seeks or obtains c
ceives a financial i
a credit agreemen
stitution.
(iv) "Financial
state or federally
ings and loan asso
industrial
loan
union, or any othei
jurisdiction of the
nancial Institution
7, Financial Instit
(b) A debtor or a en
tain an action on a ere
the agreement is in w
sideration, sets forth th
conditions, and is si
against whom enforceir
would be sought. For p
signed application cc
agreement, if the credit
ily obtain an addition,
from the debtor when j
tion.
(c) The following act
to a claim that a credit i
unless the agreement s
ments of Subsection (b
(i) the rendering
by a creditor to a
(ii) the consultati
a debtor; or
(iii) the creation
tween a creditor a]
ciary or other busi
(d) Each credit agreei
clearly stated typewritt
sion giving notice to the
ten agreement is a fin;
agreement between the
and the written agreeim
tradicted by evidence (
agreement. The provisioi
on the promissory note <
indebtedness t h a t is tied
ment.

Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written
and signed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another
— When not required to be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or in
any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise
t h a n by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
1953
25-5-2. Wilis and implied trusts excepted.
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be
construed to affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and testament;
nor to prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law.
1953
25-5-3.

TITLE 24
tESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL
ealed by Laws 1961, ch. 53, § 21; 1973,
ch. 36, § 1; 1988, ch. 121, § 18.)

TITLE 25
FRAUD
audulent Conveyances [Repealed].
le of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed].
ases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
irketing Wool [Repealed].
atute of Frauds.
liform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
CHAPTER 1
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 59, § 16.)
CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK
pealed by L a w s 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
CHAPTER 3
E A S E S A N D SALES OF LIVESTOCK
pealed b y L a w s 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(pealed by L a w s 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)
CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF F R A U D S
Ml
1.

Estate or interest in real property.

Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
t h a n one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
1953
25-5-4.

Certain agreements void unless written
and signed.
The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making of
the agreement;
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking
made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
(4) every special promise made by an executor
or administrator to answer in damages for the
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate;
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation;
(6) every credit agreement.
(a) As used in Subsection (6):
(i) "Credit agreement" means an
agreement by a financial institution to
lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things
in action, to otherwise extend credit, or
to make any other financial accommodation. "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements related to deposit accounts or
overdrafts or other terms associated

25-5-5.

Representation as to c
son.
To charge a person upon a repr
credit of a third person, such repr
Memorandum thereof, must be in
°y the party to be charged therewi
25-5-6.

Promise to a n s w e r for
other — When not i
writing.
A promise to answer for the obli
^ y of the following cases is deem
nation of the promisor and need
(1) Where the promise is m
received property of another
m g to apply it pursuant to s
one who has received a discha
tion in whole or in part in co
promise

795

FRAUD
with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
fii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a
financial accommodation under a credit
agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who
seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial accommodation, under
a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means a
state or federally chartered bank, savings and loan association, savings bank,
industrial loan corporation, credit
union, or any other institution under the
jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions as provided in Title
7, Financial Institutions Act of 1981.
(b) A debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless
the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and
conditions, and is signed by the party
against whom enforcement of the agreement
would be sought. For purposes of this act, a
signed application constitutes a signed
agreement, if the creditor does not customarlfy o6tam an additional signed' agreement
from the debtor when granting the application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise
to a claim that a credit agreement is created,
unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice
by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with
a debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a
clearly stated typewritten or printed provision giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of t h e
agreement between t h e creditor and debtor
and t h e written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral
agreement. The provision does not have to be
on the promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
1989

25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person.
To charge a person upon a representation as to the
credit of a third person, such representation, or some
memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith.
1953
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — When not required to be in
writing.
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in
any of the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the promisor and need not be in writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has
received property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by
one who has received a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in consideration of such
promise.

25-6-1

(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect to which the promise is made
i*i terms or under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise the principal
debtor and the person in whose behalf it is made
his surety.
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancel the
Antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise
As a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the party receiving it releases the
Property of another from a levy or his person
from imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or
Upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor,
whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation or from another person.
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell merchandise and to guarantee the
sale.
(5) When the holder of a n instrument for the
Payment of money upon which a third person is
°r may become liable to him transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of his own, or for a new
consideration, and in connection with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such instrument.
1953
25-5->. Contracts b y telegraph d e e m e d written.
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be
contracts in writing, and all communications sent by
telegr a ph and signed by the person sending the same,
or
by his authority, shall be deemed to be communications m writing.
1953
25-5-§. Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construe^ to abridge the powers of courts to compel the
specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
1953
25-5-ty. Agent m a y sign for principal.
Ev^jy instrument required by the provisions of this
chapter to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party.
1953
CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-3.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-§.
25-6-?.
25-6-3.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-1.1.
25-6-12.
25-6-13.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer.
Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief — Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Construction of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act."

Edward T. Wells - 3422
J. H. BOTTUM & ASSOCIATES
323 South 600 East, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 538-0700

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

t-

n 1rf

w?o l7fl

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JERRY SPICER,
Plaintiff,

C87-7595
vs.
MICHAEL S. HUGHES,

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendant.

This case came on for trial before this Court, the
Honorable

Scott

Daniels,

District

Judge,

presiding,

on

September 20, 1988. The plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, was represented
by Edward T. Wells of the firm of J. H. Bottum & Associates, and
the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was represented by Michael H.
Wray. The Court heard evidence, received exhibits and entertained
the arguments of counsel.
As to plaintiff's claims against the defendant, the Court
hereby enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about October 15, 1986, the plaintiff, Jerry

Spicer, at the request of the defendant, Michael S. Hughes,

1

/

provided to Mr. Hughes for his benefit the sum of Eleven Thousand
Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80).
2.

Said

money

was

given

at

the

request

of

the

defendant, Michael S. Hughes.
3.

At the time the money was given to Hughes by Spicer,

United States Savings & Trust (hereinafter "USS&T"), a corporation,
owed the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, sums of money relating to
stock purchases by USS&T and for a finder's fee.
4.

The money paid by the plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to

the defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was not intended as a loan, but
was repayment for past consideration furnished by the defendant to
USS&T.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The

defendant

is entitled

to

judgment

plaintiff for no cause of action.
DATED this

day of May, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Scott Daniels
District Court Judge

2

against the

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

JERRY SPICER,

4
5
6
7

Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-87-7595

vs.
MICHAEL S. HUGHES,
Defendant.

8
9

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

10
September 20, 1988
9:00 a.m.

n
12
13
14
15
1*

BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiff

17
13
19 For the Defendant:
20

Edward T. Wells
J. H. Bottum & Associates
323 South 600 East, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Michael Wray
Attorney at Law
1061 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, utah

21
22
23
24
25

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL
Registered Professional Reporter
240 East 4th South - A304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

84106

1

respect t o t h e fact that h a s been represented by defendant,

2

that is true.

3

with M r . Spicer and h e had every intention of coming

4

when I spoke t o him.

5

I d i d speak with h i m last w e e k .

I spoke

W h e n h e called m e yesterday m o r n i n g r this is

5

something that apparently flared u p again over the weekend,

7

and h e w a s n o t aware in time t o g e t a n y kind of alternative

S

transportation a n d get here.

9

T H E COURT:

W h e r e is he?

1Q

M R . WELLS:

In Florida.

Ij

T H E COURT:

0 h r Florida.

•2

a continuance will b e denied.

13

motions will b e taken under advisement.

T h e motion for

The motion —

14

M R . WELLS:

Thank you.

15

THE COURT:

W e c a n proceed.

16
17

t h e other

There is in the file a confusing pleading.
I think m a y b e this w a s your secretary r Mr. Wellsr who

13 I may have typed the wrong caption on the case and it has
19

gotten in the wrong file as a result.

20

what it h a s t o d o —

2|

M R . WELLS:

B u t I don't see

This is t h e other m a t t e r r

22

and I think that's what happened.

W e h a d t w o files in

23

the office^ and m y gal got t h e wrong heading o n i t .

24

T H E COURT:

That shouldn't b e in there.

25

M R . WELLS:

That should b e in t h e other
5

1

A

4388 Emigration Canyon Road.

2

Q

How old are you?

3

A

32.

4

Q

What is your profession?

5

A

I'm a stockbroker.

6

Q

What was your profession in October of

8

A

I was a stockbroker.

9

Q

Calling your attention to October of 1986,

7

1986?

10 by whom were ;you employed at that time?
11

A

Equity-One Corporation.

12

Q

Okay.

And again calling your attention

13 to October of 1986, did you at that time have a problem
14 in Texas with a rescission which required you to make
15 a repayment?
16

A

Yes.

17

Q

And was the sum of that repayment $11,221.80?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Even?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And this was apparently to persons in

22

It was $11,000.

Texas who had purchased stock from you?

23

A

Yes, it was.

24

Q

And as a result of that problem you were

25

under an obli<jation to repay that money?
10

A

1

Yes, I was. Not an obligation; I chose

2 to do it.
THE COURT:

3
4

I beg your pardon?

I didn't

hear the last: statement.
THE WITNESS:

5
6

under an obligation.

7

Q

I chose to do it.

I wasn't

I chose to do it.

(By Mr. Wells) And you asked Mr. Spicer

8 to make that payment for you, didn't you?
9

A

I certainly did.

10

Q

And he in fact made that payment for you?

11

A

Yes, he did.

12

Q

And since the time that he made that payment

13

for you, you have not repaid any of that money to him,

14 have you?
15

A

Heavens no.

16

Q

I hand you what's been marked as plaintiff's

17 Exhibit No. P -24, which is a letter that was shown to
18 you in your deposition in this matter.

I will ask you

19 if you recognize that letter.
20

A

Yes, I do.

21

Q

And was that letter in fact delivered

22 to you on or about the date thereof?
23

A

Yes, it was.

24

Q

And you made no response to either the

25

law firm that. sent the letter or to Mr. Spicer with respect
11

THE COURT:

1

Mr. Wray.

CROSS EXAMINATION

2
3 BY MR. WRAY;
4

Q

Mr. Hughes, did you feel it was appropriate

5 that you respond in writing to a demand from —
6

A

No, I did not.

7

Q

A t iany

time did you borrow money from

8 Mr. Wells, thi s $11,000, at any time?
9

A

From Mr. Wells?

10

Q

I'm sorry, Mr. Spicer.

11

A

No, I did not.

12

Q

Was there ever any communication between

13 you and Mr. Sp icer about a loan of $11,000 or $11,228?
A
No, there was not.
14
MR. WRAY:

15

I have no further questions,

16 Your Honor.
17

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Wells?

18

MR. WELLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20 BY MR. WELLS:
21

Q

22 did he not?
A
23

He <
3id make that payment on your behalf,

He absolutely did.

24

Q

And you asked him to make it?

25

A

You bet I did.
16

1
2
3
4

not in evidence any writing that shows, number one,, that
any of these transactions involved Mr. Spicer as the
purchaser. And number two, that Mr. Spicer ever agreed
in writing to stand good for any of these transactions.
And that's the whole problem with this defense, Your

5
Honor, is that it's all precluded by the statute of frauds.
6
THE COURT: Well, let's let Mr. Wray proceed
7
here.

I want to ask you one more question before he

8
does, Mr. Hughes.
9
EXAMINATION BY THE COURT
10
Q

I know this is a long time ago, a couple

11
of years, but as I understand the testimony, you called
12
Mr. Spicer on the phone and asked him — or told him
13
to pay this $11,000 for you; is that right?
14
15
16
17
18

Yes, I did.

Q

Okay.

Now, I know it's been a long time,

but as near as you can recall, tell me what he said and
what you said.
Let me ask you this first: When was it, about?

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A

A

October of '86.

Q

1986. And it was a telephone call?

A

Yes.

Q

And did you call him or did he call you?

A

I called him at U.S.S.&T.

In an office

there.
22

Q

Was anyone else on the line?

A

Not at the time.

Q

Was there anyone else in your office or

in his office that could have overheard part of the
conversation?
A

There was someone on my phone. My partner,

Jeff Vanos.
Q

He heard your half of it?

A

Yes, he did.

He heard

Jerry's half of

it, too. He was on the telephone with us.
Q

Oh.

A

As a matter of fact, every conversation

I had with Jerry Spicer, because of what had happened,
I had Jeff Vanos listen to every single —
THE COURT: Vanos?

V-A-N-O-S.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q

(By the Court)

As near as you can remember,

tell me what you said to him and what he said to you?
A

I said, "Jerry, I have to have something

paid to the State of Texas, or to Mr. Zwerner, in order
to preclude going to the State of Texas.
done today.

It has to be

It's $11,000. And I need to get it done."

And he said he would do it.
Q

Exactly what were his words?

Do you remember

what he said?
23

!

A

He said he would do it. He would take

2

care of it.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

And he sent a courier.

"What's the address?"

THE COURT: Do you have any questions

5

6 on that particular conversation before he moves on, either
7 of you?
8

MR. WELLS: No.

9

MR. WRAY:

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

10
11 BY MR. WRAY:
12

Q

Do you know where Mr. Spicer was located

13 at the time this conversation occurred?
14

A

I called him at U.S.S.&T., United States

15 Savings & Trust.
16

Q

Do you know what city in Texas?

17

A

Dallas, Texas.

18

Q

So you phoned Mr. Spicer in the Dallas,

19 Texas offices of U.S.S.&T?
20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Do you know what the term alter-ego means?

22

A

I think I know what it is.

23

MR. WELLS:

I'll object to his opinion

24 about that, Your Honor.
25

THE COURT: Well, sustained.
24

Wray,»

MR. WRAY:

All right.

(By Mr. Wray)

Q

You testified as to the

existence of a $10 ,000 finder' s fee.

A

Yes •

Q

Has the finder1 s fee been paid?

A

No.

Q

Is :It possible that the $11,000 transaction

that we discussed previously was in fact payment lEor
a finder1s fee?

MR. WELLS:

I'm going to object to what

THE COURT:

Sustained.

is possible.
He's testifying

that it hasn't been paid.

MR. WRAY:

Q

Well.r swell.

(By Mr. Wray)

Mr. Hughes r we have entered

into evidence some documents indicating a transaction
that occurred from the officesi of U.S.S.&T to another
office in the amount of $11,000.

Can you tell us what

that transaction was about?

A

I had a rescission in Texas that was paid

by that transaction.
Q

Was it a loan?

A

No, it was not.

MR. WELLS : I • iirgoing to object to his
41

1 conclusions without a foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.

2

He stated his

3 understanding.

5

(By Mr. Wray) Were there any — ever

Q

4

any terms for repayment of that $11,000?

6

A

No.

7

Q

By you or by anyone else?

8

A

By no one. There were no terms. There

9 was no loan.
Q

Did Mr. Spicer make any other collection

12

A

No, he did not.

13

Q

Pardon me.

14

A

No, he did not.

15

Q

Was there ever any communication after

10
11 efforts?

16 that transaction about repayment?
A

17

Until I got the letter from Mr. Wells,

18 there was none:.
19

Q

And that was approximately how long ago?

20

A

I guess that was October.

Q

Is that approximately a week or a year

21
22

It was October

28, 1987.

23 or ten years, or how long ago?
24

A

A year.

25

Q

So for a period of a year there is not

1

any communication about this transaction between you

2

A

Absolutely not.

3

Q

Have you ever felt it was a loan?

4

A

No.

5

Q

Do you feel today it's a loan?

6

A

No.

7

Q

Did you feel at the time it was a loan?

8

A

No.

9
10

MR. WRAY:

—

Your Honor, I have no further

questions of this witness.

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Wells:

12

MR. WELLS:

Yes, I do have a few.

13

THE COURT:

Maybe we'll take a five minutes

14

recess before you start your cross examination.

15

be in recess for about five minutes.

16

(Morning recess)

17

THE COURT:

Proceed, Mr. Wells.

18

MR. WELLS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION

19
20
21

We'll

BY MR. WELLS:
Q

It's true, is it not, that at the time

22

you asked Mr. Spicer to take care of this for you there

23

was some need to move quickly?

24

A

Uh huh.

25

Q

You told him there was a time problem

(Indicating affirmative)
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1 and you needed to get the check there that day?
2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And so this was a way for you in Salt

4

Lake of getting a check delivered to Texas that day,

5

was to have Mr. Spicer take care of it for you?

6

A

Yes, it was.

7

Q

And you in fact told him that there was

8

a time problem, it had to be done that day?

9

A

Yes, I did.

10

Q

Now, with respect to this finder's fee,

11

I believe you testified that you were introduced to Mr.

12

Spicer as president of CITRAM; is that correct?
A

13

I was introduced to him as Jerry Spicer.

14 He ended up being the president of CITRAM.
15 1
16

Q

He is the president of CITRAM, and CITRAM

was looking for a partner.

17

A

Yes, they were.

18

Q

And you were going to act on behalf of

19

them to put them together with somebody that could merge

20

with them?

21
22
23
24
25

A

Sort of the other way around.

I represented

the Gold Hold people and found CITRAM for them.
Q

So you were representing the other side

of the deal and putting them together with CITRAM?
A

No.

When they came to me I was representing
44

1 that I knew some of these people who were in fact looking
2

for those merger opportunities.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

They came to me, asked me if I could help

5 them put one! together, and I said yes.
Q

And when you say "they," who are you talking

8

A

Jerry Spicer and Bill Windsor.

9

Q

And Mr. Spicer came to you and said, "can

6
7

about?

10 you help me put together a merger for CITRAM"?
11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And you said, "Yes, I can get a merger

13 partner for CITRAM"?
14

A

No.

I said, "I will try and find someone

15 who could help him to —
You were going to find somebody who would
Q
16
17 help CITRAM get a merger put together?
18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And for your fees for putting that merger

20 together yori were going to get a finder's fee?
21

A

Yes, I was.

22

Q

And that finder's fee would be paid to

23 you if the merger came about?
24

A

Yes, it was.

25

Q

And was to be paid to you for in fact
45

1 helping to bring the merger about?
2

A

Yes.

3

Q

That was something CITRAM wanted you to

4

do and something that the other corporation wanted you

5 to do?
6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Were you going to get a finder's fee from

8 each side?
9

A

No, I was not.

10

Q

Which side of the deal was responsible

11 for the finder's fee?
12

A

Jerry Spicer was.

13

Q

So that would have been the CITRAM side

14 of the deal?
15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And so CITRAM was going to pay you a finder's

17 fee if you could find a suitable merger partner?
18

A

Yes, that's correct.

19

Q

Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything

20 I in writing that said that if CITRAM didn't pay that fee
21
22
23

that he would pay it to you personally?
A

No, he did not.
MR. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm

24 going to move to strike all the testimony regarding the
25 supposed finder's fee on the basis of the statute of
46

1 frauds, because he has just testified that Mr. Spicer
2 never agreed personally to assume that.

He's testified

3 that it was a finder's fee from CITRAM which was to be

4 paid upon the completion of a successful merger.

And

5 apparently this merger came about and the fee is owed
6 by CITRAM.

But there is no evidence that Mr. Spicer

7 in fact ever agreed to be personally responsible for
8 that.
THE COURT:

9

Overruled.

I think even if

10 it's not legally collectible it goes to the issue of
11 what the $11,000 transaction was all about, and therefore,
12 the motion to strike will be denied.
MR. WELLS: Well, Your Honor, the statute

13

14 does say that it cannot be used as a defense.
THE COURT:

15

I understand that.

But in

16 this particular instance it's not being used as a setoff,
17 it is being used to explain the purpose of the $11,000
18 transaction, and the motion is denied.
19

Anything further.
MR. WELLS:

20
21

Q

Yes, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Wells)

Now, you have previously

22 testified regarding the telephone conversation.
23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Is there anything else you can remember

25 about that conversation that you haven't told us?
47

Q

That's a corporation.

A

Yes, it is*

Q

Have you ever received from Mr. Spicer

anything in writing wherein he agreed to personally pay
any debts owed to you by that corporation?
A

No. Of course not.
MR. WELLS: That's all I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Wray, anything further.
MR. WRAY:

Your Honor, I have nothing

further.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

Do you

have any more witnesses, Mr. Wray?
MR. WRAY:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses.
MR. WELLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

I believe

that would be appropriate, and we do have some rebuttal
testimony from Mr. Spicer.
And as I indicated to the court earlier, because
of his health problems he is unable to be here.

I would

move that the court allow the case to remain open to
a later date when we can have Mr. Spicer appear and testify,
THE COURT:
advisement earlier.

That motion was taken under

After having heard the testimony,

I think my inclination is to deny that motion.
This matter was continued once.

Mr. Spicer
49

1

did have an opportunity to be here, and I think today

2

is the day set for trial.

3

he were here he would say that he had a different under-

4

standing than Mr. Hughes, and there may be some differences

5

in his testimony, but I don't think that the nature of

6

the case is such that it would be unfair to not allow

7

him to testify.

3
9
10

I would anticipate that if

And based upon that, the motion is denied.

Do you have a closing statement to make, Mr.
Wells?
MR. WELLS:

Yes, Your Honor.

Before I

11 I do that, though, I would once again move to strike all
12 of the testimony of Mr. Hughes relating to monies owed
13 to him by CITRAM as a finder's fee and by U.S.S.&T for
14 whatever reason on the grounds that those debts are not
15 material to the issues of this lawsuit.

They are not

16 relevant to the issues of this lawsuit.

And the question

17 before the court is whether or not Mr. Jerry Spicer had
18 an antecedent debt personally owing to the defendant
19 which could have been used as an offset for the amounts
20

loaned and advanced on his behalf by Mr. Spicer and as

2|

shown by the testimony.

22

The statute of frauds precludes any consideration

23 by the court of debts owing to Mr. Hughes by either of
24 the corporations because of the fact that there is no
25 evidence of a writing, as required by the statute of
50

1

frauds.

And so I would therefore move the court that

2

all of the testimony relating to debts owed to the

3

defendant by any corporate entity be stricken at this

4

time,

5

THE COURT:

6

for a few moments,

7

closing argument,

8

I will let you continue with your

MR, WELLS:

9 I

I will take that under advisement

Thank you, Your Honor.

As I indicated. Your Honor, this is a relatively

10

simple case.

If the court will recall the testimony,

11

and specifically when the court was inquiring of Mr.

12 Hughes with respect to the conversation he had with Mr.
13

Spicer at the time that he needed this money paid in

14 Texas, he testified that he called and ask Jerry if he
15 would pay that money for him, and Jerry~said yes.
15

I think it is very —

I guess telling is a

17

good word that with respect to the claim of the defendant

18

he did not claim that in that conversation he said to

19

Jerry, you can take care of the monies you owe me, or

20

this will take care of the finder's fee, or this will

21

take care of anything else,

22

He said nothing in that conversation which

23

would have indicated to Mr. Spicer that he was asking

24

him to repay an amount previously owed to him.

25

If you will recall, he testified that he called
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (j).

This case is an appeal

from the District Court and has been transferred to the Court of
Appeal from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Defendant had an implied duty at law to repay

monies paid for his benefit and at his request by the Plaintiff.
2.

The

Statute

of

Frauds

precluded

evidence

and

findings of an agreement by Plaintiff to repay money owed to
Defendant by USS&T Corporation or to cover losses to Defendant
caused by third parties.
3.

The Trial Court's findings number 3 and 4 and the

Judgment are not supported by the evidence.
4.

The Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing

to hold the case open to receive Plaintiff's testimony.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2):
The following agreements are void unless the agreement,
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement:
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

case

was

commenced

by

Jerry

Spicer

filing

a

complaint against Michael Hughes to collect the sum of Eleven
Thousand

Two

Hundred

Twenty-One
1

Dollars

and

Eighty

Cents

($11,221.80) from Mr. Hughes. Plaintiff claimed that Hughes asked
him by telephone to loan him money to take care of an obligation
in Dallas, Texas which required payment of $11,000.00 on the date
of the phone call.

Plaintiff, as a friendly accommodation, made

the payment on behalf of Defendant and when Defendant did not
return the money and pay the expenses upon demand, suit was filed.
The suit alleged that money was loaned to Defendant and repayment
was refused.

Defendant claimed no loan was made and no obligation

of repayment existed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Bench Trial was held on September 20, 1988, after the
Court refused to grant a Motion for Continuance due to illness of
Plaintiff who was unable to travel to Utah from Florida for the
trial.

The Trial Court also refused to allow the testimony of

Plaintiff to be taken subsequently.

The Court entered Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and awarded judgment in favor of
Defendant dismissing the action.

A timely notice of appeal was

filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Michael Hughes testified that in October of
1986 he was working for Equity One Corporation and he had a
rescission

problem

in

Texas

$11,000.00 payment TR:10.

which

required

him

to

make

an

Hughes stated he had an obligation to

repay the $11,000.00 TR:10-11.

Hughes testified he asked the

Plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to make the payment on his behalf.
TR:11.

He further admitted he had never repaid Spicer for making

the payment on his behalf.

Id. See also TR:16, Ln. 21-25.

2

Mr. Hughes testified specifically as to the telephone
call wherein he asked Plaintiff to advance the money on his
behalf.

He stated:
I said, "Jerry, I have to have something
State of Texas, or to Mr. Zwerner, in order
going to the State of Texas. It has to be
It's $11,000.00 and I need to get it done."
he would do it. TR:23, Ln. 19-23.

Mr. Spicer was in Dallas, Texas at the time.

paid to the
to preclude
done today.
and he said

TR:24, Ln. 12-17.

Exhibit D-12 is the check paid to Mr. Zwerner on behalf
of Mr. Hughes by Mr. Spicer.
While Mr. Hughes testified there were never any agreed
terms for the repayment (TR:42) he did testify that the money was
paid by Mr. Spicer at his request, to
obligation.

fulfill his personal

TR:10-11.

Mr. Hughes admitted that his purpose in asking Spicer,
who was in Dallas, Texas, to take care of a money problem was that
he

had

to

move

quickly.

The

testimony

of

Mr.

Hughes

is

enlightening as to what occurred.
Q

It's true, is it not, that at the time you asked
Mr. Spicer to take care of this (the money problem)
for you there was some need to move quickly?

A

Uh huh. (Indicating affirmative)

Q

You told him there was a time problem and you
needed to get the check there that day.

A

Yes.

Q

And so this was a way for you in Salt Lake of
getting a check delivered to Texas that day, was to
have Mr. Spicer take care of it for you.

A

Yes, it was.

TR:43-44
3

At the close of testimony, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to
allow rebuttal testimony to be taken at a later date from Mr.
Spicer who was unable to attend the trial due to illness,

TR:49

No claim was made and no evidence was introduced to show
that the money paid on behalf of Mr. Hughes by Plaintiff was a
gift or that anyone considered it a gift.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

District

Defendant in this case.

Court

erred

in

granting

judgment

to

The unrefuted testimony of Defendant was

that he requested Plaintiff to help him handle an emergency in
which he was involved that required a payment of $11,000.00 to be
made immediately in Texas.

Defendant's own description of events

was that he had to make a payment in Texas on the date he made a
call to Mr. Spicer in Texas to ask for his help.

TR:23, 43-44.

He asked Spicer as a friend to help him solve the problem Jd and
as a friend Spicer did so by paying the amount due from his own
funds.

See Ex. D-12.
Thus the only evidence in the record shows conclusively

the following as true:
1.

Hughes had a debt to be paid immediately in Dallas,

2.

Hughes was in Salt Lake City.

3.

Hughes called Spicer in Dallas and asked him if he

Texas.

could help him out by paying the amount due in Dallas.
4.

Spicer said yes and made the payment on behalf of

Hughes.
4

The Court made the following

findings of fact with

respect to the above items:
Finding 1. On or about October 15, 198 6, the Plaintiff,
Jerry Spicer, at the request of the Defendant, Michael S.Hughes,
provided to Mr. Hughes for his benefit the sum of Eleven Thousand
Two Hundred Twenty-One Dollars and Eighty Cents ($11,221.80).
Finding 2.

Said money was given at the request of the

Defendant, Michael S. Hughes.
Under the said evidence it is clear there was a loan to Hughes
which he has either a legal or equitable duty to repay.
If there was any question regarding the above facts and
the fact that a loan was made, it was then error for the trial
judge to refuse to hold the case open to receive the testimony of
Mr. Spicer.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.
DEFENDANT HAD AN IMPLIED DUTY AT LAW TO REPAY MONIES
PAID FOR HIS BENEFIT AND AT HIS REQUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF.
At common law, a party had the right to bring an action
in assumpsit to recover money paid on behalf of another to a third
party.

The general rule is that if one pays money to a third

party for the use or benefit of another at such person's express
or implied request, he can recover the money so paid from such
other person.

It has been held the law implies a promise to repay

in such a case.

The old assumpsit rule appears to be universally

accepted today.

See e. g. Minskv's Follies of Florida v. Serines,
5

206 F.2d 1,4 (5th Cir. 1953); Sommer v. Nakdimen. 97 F.2d 715, 721
(8th Cir. 1938); Island Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 57 F.2d 992

(4th Cir. 1932) Cert. den. 287 U.S. 646

(1933); Roussel v. Russel, 339 P.2d 522, 527 (Okla. 1959); Kennedy
v. Conrad, 9 Mont. 356, 9 P.2d 1075, 1078, (1932).
In the Roussell case, supra, the Court stated:
The rule is that where one pays out money at the special
instance and request of another, the law implies a promise on
the part of the latter to repay it. 339 P.2d at 527.
In the Kennedy case, supra, the Court stated:
...[I]t is not necessary to sustain Plaintiff's right of
recovery that there be an express promise on the part of
defendants to repay the value of the casing; for the
rule is that, "where one pays out money at the special
instance and request of another, the law implies a
promise on the part of the latter to repay it.11 9 P. 2d
at 1078 (citations omitted).
Thus it is clear from the cases and the evidence that Defendant
Hughes had a duty to repay the monies advanced on his behalf by
Mr.

Spicer

in the sum of $11,221.80 which consisted

$11,000.00 plus expenses incurred

of the

in delivering the money of

$221.80.
Point II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PRECLUDED EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF
AN AGREEMENT BY PLAINTIFF TO REPAY MONEY OWED TO DEFENDANT BY
USS&T CORPORATION OR TO COVER LOSSES TO DEFENDANT CAUSED BY THIRD
PARTIES.
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2), as part of the
Utah Statute of Frauds, precludes enforcement of a contract to
answer for the debt of a third party absent a writing.
6

Mr. Hughes testified he was owed a finder's fee by
Citram Corporation.

As of the date of tricil, such fee had not

been paid by Citram Corporation.

TR:41 at 6-7.

Hughes testified

on cross examination that he was owed the finder's fee in a
merger.

TR:45, Ln. 19-24.

Hughes testified Spicer was an officer

of Citram Corporation, which corporation owed the finder's fee.
TR:46.

Hughes specifically testified as follows:
Q

and so Citram was going to pay you a finder's fee
if you could find a suitable merger partner?

A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

Now, did Mr. Spicer ever give you anything in
writing that said if Citram didn't pay that fee
that he would pay it to you personally?

A

No, he did not.

TR:46, Ln. 16-22.
Objection was properly made to all testimony of Mr.
Hughes as to debts of third parties for which he claimed Mr.
Spicer was responsible (see TR:21, 46-47) and proper motions to
strike such testimony were made. See TR:46-47, 50-51.

The motion

was overruled TR:47.
Clearly it is improper to allow such testimony.
Findings number 3 and 4 that USS&T owed money to Hughes
and that the money paid by Spicer on behalf of Hughes was a
repayment of such amounts were apparently based upon such evidence
even though such evidence is clearly precluded by the Statute of
Frauds.

7

Point III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NUMBER

3 AND 4 AND THE

JUDGMENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The

Court

as

part

of

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law made the following factual findings numbered 3
and 4 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
3.

At the time the money was given to Hughes by

Spicer, United States Savings & Trust (hereinafter "USS&T"), a
corporation of which Spicer was an officer, owed the Defendant,
Michael S. Hughes, sums of money relating to stock purchases by
USS&T and for a finder's fee.
4.

The money paid by the Plaintiff, Jerry Spicer, to

the Defendant, Michael S. Hughes, was not intended as a loan, but
was repayment for past consideration furnished by the Defendant to
USS&T.
Based upon findings 3 and 4, the court concluded in its
conclusion of law as follows:
The

Defendant

is entitled

to

judgment

against

the

Plaintiff for no cause of action.
Such a judgment was then entered.
Nowhere in the transcript do we have any competent
admissable evidence that supports the conclusion that the money
advanced personally by Jerry spicer to pay the debt of Michael
Hughes was intended by the parties to repay debts owed to Hughes
by third parties or indeed that such moneys were owed to Hughes by
Mr. Spicer.

The statute of frauds precludes evidence that such
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was the case.

The statute specifically provides that proof of an

agreement to pay debts of third parties which is not in writing
cannot be used as a defense.

Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4.

The defense of Hughes was that he was entitled to offset moneys
owed to Spicer by him against money owed to him by third persons
associated with Spicer. The purpose of the statute is to preclude
the very situation we have in this case. Spicer advances money at
the request of Hughes (Findings of Fact 1 and 2).

Nothing is said

by Hughes at the time he makes the request of Spicer that Hughes
considers the money advanced to be repayment of obligations owed
to him by third parties (see TR: 22-24, 47, Ln. 24 through 48,
Ln. 9) and then when Spicer seeks his legal remedy to recover for
the money advanced, Hughes says in effect

fl

I don't owe anything,

I set off what you owed against what I was owed by these third
parties (USS&T).
Such testimony is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

The

Court erred in admitting such testimony.

The Court erred in

denying the motion to strike such testimony.

See TR:4 6-47.

It is certainly error to base findings 3 and 4 on such
testimony.

Without the erroneously admitted testimony, there is

no testimony to support findings 3 and 4 and without findings 3
and 4 the Judgment and conclusion of law have no basis in the
record and were erroneously entered.
Point IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
HOLD THE CASE OPEN TO RECEIVE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY.
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Having denied Plaintiff's Motion to continue the trial
due to the inability of Plaintiff to attend for medical reasons
(TR:5), it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow the case
to remain open to allow rebuttal testimony from Mr. Spicer.
The evidence adduced from the mouth of the Defendant in
this case clearly shows, for the reasons set forth in Point I
above,

and

Plaintiff

in the

Court's

is entitled

findings

to recover

numbered

from

1 and

Defendant the

2, that
amounts

advanced for him by the Plaintiff.
The Court, however, proceeded to allow defendant to
testify, over objection, as to numerous unrelated transactions
involving third parties who were not parties to the litigation,
wherein defendant claimed debts were owed to him by such third
parties.

The Court then, over objection, allowed defendant to

testify that he considered that Spicer "owed him" for his losses
in dealing with these third parties and that he was entitled to
offset what the third

parties

owed

him

against

the

amounts

advanced by Spicer to pay his debt.
Having allowed such testimony and denied a motion to
strike all such testimony (TR:46-47) the Court then refused to
allow the case to remain open to allow rebuttal from Mr. Spicer.
TR:49-50.
The trial was to the Court.
any

detriment

were

the

motion

to

Defense made no claim of
be

granted.

Under

the

circumstances, counsel respectfully suggests that the refusal to
allow the record to be supplemented with Plaintiff's testimony was
an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, premises

considered,

counsel

respectfully

suggests that as a matter of law, as set forth in Point I,
Plaintiff was and is entitled to judgment against Mr. Hughes for
$11,221.80 plus interest at the statutory rate until paid; that
the Court erred in holding the money paid on behalf of Hughes by
Spicer was intended as repayment of debts owed to Hughes by third
persons; and that the Judgment of the District Court should be
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to vacate the
Judgment and to enter judgment for Plaintiff as prayed for in the
Complaint.
Respectfully submitted this j ^ / ^ a y of November, 1989.

Edward T/ Wells
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellant
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